SECRET-EYES ONLY

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Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action: after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed while resisting arrest. The others were arrested, confessed, and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the small group that actually did the killing.)

There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters. Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty, many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

> The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L. Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the 69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near his capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the request of the assassins.
>
> The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
>
> As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened, talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was established between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . was named Plato Cox.
>
> The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but was later allowed to leave the country.
>
> The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators.

Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961, invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a postponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators, who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity. This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.

It can be reported on excellent authority that close associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing.

Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic by US officials. . . . . . Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if Trujillo had never lived.

We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the

furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo. Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however, has a vague impression that one of them was.

The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Owen, who was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able

to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records, we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly to the quite complete record that appears in the EMDEED operational files.

Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were assigned the cryptonym EMDEED. One segment of EMDEED was known as EMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Most of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant documents were not put into the EMDEED files but were kept in a private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us. We also have studied another particularly useful document. The Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in charge of the investigation of the Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz. The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa in November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power failed. The New York field office of the FBI held extensive interviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the assassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogations of the persons it apprehended.

From the records (the [illegible] operational files), we can trace the origins and the course of U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:

> The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel.
>
> The function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed Forces.
>
> The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert Barreras and Salvador Estrella. . . . . . They were joined by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the government because of his involvement in the

* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966)

Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.

The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . . . .

The over-all authority appears to have centered principally in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient prestige to command authority. . . . . .

The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going to drive to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the Palace would inform the others by personal message. . . . . .

The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any event, the plan went into execution. . . . . . Each of them had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own sawed-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles. . . . . .

The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to reach General Roman. . . . . .

The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz, where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until the danger had passed.

The FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM investigator, gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the assassination took place. One of the assassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions). All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. While in delirium he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan Tomas." The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived. The rest were caught and interrogated followingtorture. All confessed.

The confessions led to identification of persons who were in or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz. Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not

discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the Consulate was actually working, because neither of the men who might have known the identities were available for interrogation. Amiama Tio escaped and General Diaz was killed.

Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group were fairly widely known to persons not actually members of it, there appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political and the Action Groups--perhaps too much compartmentation. The assassination itself was well planned. General Diaz was in over-all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all of the work. He took three cars to a local garage and had the engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus several of his own. He and the other participants took the cars to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each night. Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassination was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.

General Roman, who was to take over the government after Trujillo's death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telephone General Roman but could not reach him. Diaz then took the car with Trujillo's body still in its trunk and drove to Roman's house. He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the trunk, where it was later found by the police.

What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately heard shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the alarm and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him. He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. Thus, General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Roman that

Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his move to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had been a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. He did not know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. He was reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. By the time Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late for him to act; Hector Trujillo and Johnny Abbes had already taken charge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering a take over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan nor any appreciable chances of succeeding.

The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took place against a background of international activity in opposition to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-cut stands. These are some of the highlights:

a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of human rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrests in the Dominican Republic in January 1960. A committee of the

OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1960 that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.

b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government announced after capture of most of the assassins that the Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betancourt's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were continued.

As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation EMDEED/EMSLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people involved, especially since officers of the Department of State played a very prominent role.

<u>Washington - Department of State</u>

Roy R. Rubottom	Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Frank Devine	Special Assistant to Rubottom
John C. Hill	Special Assistant to Rubottom

<u>Washington - CIA</u>

J. C. King	Chief, WH Division
Ned Holman	Chief, Branch III, WH Division

<u>Ciudad Trujillo - Department of State</u>

Joseph S. Farland	Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is pertinent to note that King and Esterline attribute U.S. and CIA involvement

with the plotters in the Dominican Republic to Ambassador Farland. They describe him as a former FBI employee who considered himself quite a clandestine operator. Esterline, who later served under him in Panama, called him "a wild man who bugged the Agency to support a move to assassinate Trujillo." He had direct dealings with a number of the key plotters.

Henry Dearborn	Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August 1960 and Consul General thereafter. He used the code name DELTA in correspondence with the plotters.
John D. Barfield	Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 and a consular officer thereafter. CIA cryptonym: EMDAZE-1

<u>Ciudad Trujillo - CIA</u>

Lear Reed	Chief of Station until October 1960
Robert Owen	Chief of Station from 20 January until 4 June 1961. Code name used with the plotters: GALGO
Charles Cookson	Operations Officer
Isabel Cintron	Administrative Assistant

<u>Key Dominican Plotters</u>

Dr. Jordi Brossa	Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO
Juan Vicini	Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE
Luis Baquero	Code name: SOCRATES

S. Thomas Stocker	An American in the Dominican Republic with whom the station had had an earlier unhappy experience. The consulate preferred to have nothing to do with him, but the Dominican plotters brought him in as a cutout to the consulate. He took delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three carbines passed to Berry from the U.S. Consulate for use by the plotters. He held them for a few days and then gave them back when Berry insisted they be returned. Berry then passed them to one of the assassins.
Dr. Severo Cabral	Code names: HECTOR and PLUTARCO
Jose Francisco Tapia	
Aulio Brea	
Andres Freitas	Code name: ANDY
Luis Amiama Tio	
Jose Rene Roman	
Juan Tomas Diaz	Code name: CRISTOBAL
Donald Reid Cabral	Code name: CIBAO
Lorenzo D. Berry	"Wimpy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen who owned Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo. He was the main communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. The weapons furnished the plotters were actually passed to Berry.
Flerida Berry	Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citizen of Syrian extraction. She appears to have been even more active in the plot than her husband. It was she who had the contacts with the Dominicans involved.

Most communications between the Dominican plotters and the U.S. Consulate were by means of written notes. Mrs. Berry received the notes from or passed them to either the Consul General's secretary or the CIA Station's administrative assistant.

Two documents provide a useful point of departure, from an historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had been played by CIA prior to 1960.

16 November 1959

Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:

> ". . . within this group there is growing militant anti-American feeling based on the premise that the United States should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non-intervention. . . . . . This group is in possession of clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."

15 February 1960

A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:

> "The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations; however, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and with the Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled him on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to criticisms of and activities directed against the Dominican government by exiles and other American governments unfriendly to the Dominican regime."

10 March 1960

This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo, with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was

no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune inside would be placed in trust, to be administered by internationally-known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.

This proposition received high-level attention in Washington, including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the meeting.

22 March 1960

Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow

bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy" who would tell Trujillo to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatum, the plan then outlined steps for transition to an operating representative government. The army would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these comments of his own to Rubottom:

> " . . . this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect United States assistance. . . . .
>
> "Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement a definite constructive program to influence the course of events in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities of this type of approach. . . . . "

<u>30 March & 7 April 1960</u>

The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the

event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S. civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On 7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving willingly:

> " . . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Batista."

9 April 1960

State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which the following is an extract:

> "Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invasions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . .
>
> "What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover . . . . . "

"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority at present contemplates such action. . . . . "

11 April 1960

Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:

"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders are known to me including names their selectees for top governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose secret discussions. . . . .

"Regardless of . . . seething unrest which exists, indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of following developments (which we summarize below):

(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.

(2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.

(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."

(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.

(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."

(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it.

Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added:

"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist

them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could fully substantiate this cooperation. . . . . . "

9 May 1960

A memorandum addressed to Chief, WH Division, and signed by P.E. Oberst, Chief, WH/CA, reports steps taken or recommended for improving CIA's capabilities in the Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or Fidelistas. Among things recommended were: placement of a junior officer in the embassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a contingency PM plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."

A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows:

> "The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity.
>
> "Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support.

(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations. Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28 June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated 13 June, but he never took the post.)

3 June 1960

Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the meeting includes this comment:

> "Farland then told me that the underground opposition are planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty well along and could be executed at any time."

Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)

The author is not identified nor is there any indication that the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo

refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.

17 June 1960

Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, queried State through CIA channels, asking for confirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader, Dr. Jordi Brossa. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position as follows:

a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against the Trujillo government while it is in full control.

b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.

c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional government which controls a substantial section of the Dominican Republic.

20 June 1960

Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied in the affirmative.

28 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on, for planning purposes, was the period extending through the "incapacitation" of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.

Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . . ." Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the undergound to accomplish a revolt.

29 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt. ##

Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking up arms at sea and for caching in nearby caves. He also described an airdrop site.

1 July 1960

A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.

> "It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same. . . . . . It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.
>
> "Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve 30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable

added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."

8 July 1960

Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:

> " . . . imperative learn from /Juan Vicini/ and/or /Dr. Jordi Brossa/ what plans and capabilities are to be employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo and what is needed in way of material support for implementation of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent of military participation in preparations. In spite of /Vicini/ apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that must have some plan and capability for action which will assure stable interim government after removal of Trujillo. . . . . . In your opinion are /Vicini/ and /Brossa/ members of same group or if not could the two groups be merged? . . . . . "

8 September 1960

The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September) proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.

18 October 1960

Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals

obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition. The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your verbal request on 13 October 1960 . . . " This is the memorandum to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.

29 December 1960

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read, in part:

> "Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such . . . . . He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
>
> " . . . . . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . . . it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be."

(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.)

12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the

Special Group on this date:

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the group being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project."

19 January 1961

Cable from headquarters:

"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable, authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms. . . . . . Above coordinated with State."

24 January 1961

Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED by members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:

"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."

(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)

31 January 1961

"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State Department:

"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6 February 1961

Cable from headquarters:

"1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would appreciate /dissidents'/ reaction to offer of armed assistance to include /dissidents'/ current plan . . .

"2. Also request /Robert Owen's/ initial assessment /dissidents'/ capability carry out plan of action once limited armed assistance provided."

10 February 1961

The station cabled its reply:

"No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.

"Initial assessment is /Erossa and Vicini/ could not carry out plan. But with access /Dr. Severo Cabral/ he now approaching point when will better be able evaluate group potential for action. We some weeks away from being able make solid preliminary assessment.

"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small

size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could come later."

14 February 1961

At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:

> " . . . asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum in CIA files.)

15 February 1961

Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his memorandum record of the meeting follow:

> " . . . . . Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities of arms from Army contacts . . . but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired.
>
> "Vicini said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materiels and methods . . . a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby

electronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. . . . . .

"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator."

4 March 1961

Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum of his meeting with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage and kill him with guns and grenades:

"Vicini idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view."

(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)

The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:

" . . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost, believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . . "

5 March 1961

As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be assured as much as human fallibility permits. . . . . . "

7 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the field, in part:

"Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, request station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned . . . . . Request type and quantity arms desired. . . . . . "

8 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and group plan try kill Trujillo by /intercepting his car/ at point near /Wimpy's Supermarket/. Date not set and obviously depends on Trujillo travel . . . Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved."

8 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently additional details in order make plans timely assistance. Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that requested . . . . ."

13 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas): Freitas speaks for Amiama Tio group which includes military members . . . in six brigade Hqs and which have capability, at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta in control provisional govt. . . . . . Request following station action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Hqs places special emphasis on identifying military membership Amiama Tio group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess realistically chances successful takeover."

15 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked [a consulate employee] for small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.' By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and learned the dissident group must do EMSLEW [kill Trujillo] this month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths are apparently aware renewal plan . . . . . Wimpy asked for five 45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for

same, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 64mm tank rockets. . . . . "

16 March 1961

Headquarters cabled its reply:

"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is Berry making request on own initiative or is he speaking for Dr. Severo Cabral? . . . . . "

17 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For issue to several /of the dissident group/ Consul General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try get from Marines.

"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion /to send in each pouch one small size high fire power weapon/ as Dearborn increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for /assassination/ decline result lack tangible or too slow action on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day more involved in /the operation/. Loss of one of key people thru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE/EMBEED activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend themselves against SIM."

18 March 1961

Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr. Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:

"His group [assassination] plan now this: Group knows identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment incognito and lightly guarded. Group apparently has someone in building who can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [assassination], possibly including mistress, in silence.

"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job. . . . . . Severo Cabral's final position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination].

"Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing risk chaos for period of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to get decisive agreement support before [assassination].

20 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms . . . Will deliver to the group's representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. Coordinated with State Department."

22 March 1961

The station replied, in part:

" . . . we realize permission does not now exist but Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then

please continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms . . . or import arms by [other] means. Completely negative plea for arms, whatever delivery method, will end cooperation Severo Cabral and probably by [Wimpy and Mrs. Berry]. *

25 March 1961

The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P (Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Owen's responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government. "If above clarifies Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly. In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing orders permit return for consultations."

(Comment: We do not know whether Owen replied to this cable or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did go to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot

* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.

establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine guns.)

26 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which available consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . . . . ."

(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)

27 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be pouched] makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package; or whether split shipment preferable."

(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)

29 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. Advise. . . . . . Pouching . . . nine magazines . . . "

31 March 1961

The station replied:

"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Berry by the station's female administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of

good will to Severo Cabral now. These items are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The security risk in his having these items is no greater than his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated and less secure cache or drop."

Headquarters cable to the station:

"/Passing the three carbines/ approved. Advise Hqs when passing of this equipment completed.

(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)

7 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines/ contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine magazines."

9 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The station's female administrative assistant/ passed /the three carbines/ to /Wimpy Berry/ April 7. No complications."

(Comment: The files do not contain an account of how the carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents. Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose use essentially same technique as that for /the three carbines/.

/The station's female administrative assistant/ driving own car will go to local supermarket /Wimpy Berry's/ for usual Saturday morning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assist from Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car trunk with groceries. /Station operations officer/ will then accompany to administrative assistant's apartment, help take groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer, /Wimpy Berry/ will arrive in personal car, pick up items from operations officer at partially concealed entrance to administrative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for his visit will be commercial delivery.")

7 April 1961

Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection."

(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station. This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was

at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)

12 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Equipment for Severo Cabral [submachine guns] which subject of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14 April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of delivery proposed."

(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on the 9 April entry.)

13 April 1961

An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from Juan Vicini:

"The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines], with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day or two. . . . . . With the small amount of equipment which they are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and the time factor considerably extended accordingly. With the rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) [the submachine guns] the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost time greatly reduced."

14 April 1961

Extract from a note from SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA

[Consul General Dearborn]:

"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."

17 April 1961

Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA [Dearborn]:

"The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras: CRISTOBAL [General Juan Tomas Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographic job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3 Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing is waiting for the heavy cameras."

17 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . . . most important [the submachine guns] not/repeat not be passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery."

20 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry]. This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created by [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.

"Request station provide foll info soonest: (a) Have [the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) Details on an alternate plan to deliver [submachine guns] which would involve ground caching."

(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of Pigs.)

20 April 1961

Note to DELTA [Dearborn] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:

"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."

20 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin."

(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall, writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the submachine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so, we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food containers, but not in connection with pouching.)

21 April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the station:

"/Submachine guns/ should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to /Wimpy Berry/.

22 April 1961

The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April regarding disposition of the three carbines:

" . . . . . /Wimpy Berry/ has given /the three carbines/ to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up . . . . . "

(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Tomas Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for 31 May.)

25 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Foll from Dearborn: 'I believe political consequence of not delivering [submachine guns] so serious I plan go Washington within next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"

26 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other members assassination effort but General Juan Tomas Diaz probably will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can get. De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible . . . . ."

30 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info: . . . main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gauge shotguns with 120 rounds and some small arms. . . . . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal

and few additional weapons could be important. . . . . . I replied I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S. controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study and assessment. . . . . . "

2 May 1961

Cable from the station:

" . . . . . suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the overthrow of the Trujillo regime."

2 May 1961

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

" . . . . . Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . . . . . "

(Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated by Ray Herbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release. General Cabell attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div., unacted upon.")

4 May 1961

The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these would work or not.

5 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret delay but release [of the submachine guns] awaits high level State Department decision."

8 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"State Department has disapproved passing [submachine guns].

16 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep . . . . . "

(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible memorandum in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and concerns a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transmittal dispatch makes

it clear that the author was Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant. This is our interpretation of what Miss Cintron was trying to say: Sometime during the second week of May, Wimpy Berry asked Thomas Stocker to return the three carbines Berry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at first refused but finally agreed. /Presumably Berry then passed them to Antonio de la Maza./ On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession, and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that Berry had been working with on behalf of the consulate. SOCRATES (Luis Baquero) arrived at the supermarket while Stocker was still with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if he had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was to do the job did not know each other's identities. While Mrs. Berry was talking with Baquero, the man to whom Berry had last given the weapons /presumably Antonio de la Maza/ arrived at the supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he had returned the carbines to Stocker. He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he always carried them.)

18 May 1961

There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:

"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." *

25 May 1961

The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention of the subject.

27 May 1961

The station cabled:

"Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with Andreas Freitas. . . . . . Freitas made no request for arms which indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has.

* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the dissidents.

His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is somewhat concerned whether enough.

"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic elements of which he member remains on brink final performance and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow Trujillo.

"I replied . . . speed with which assistance could be given would be increased considerably if we could have prior info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities involved and identity of proposed junta. . . . . . He replied participants were not prepared give their names until afterward and could not give time for reasons stated earlier. . . . . .

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize."

29 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"For Dearborn from State . . . . . We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. . . . . . You must request and receive further specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. . . . ."

(Comment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent

cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed

in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)

31 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"State from Dearborn . . . . . If attempt is made by U.S. friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from consulate. Stocker told me same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents I told him this impossible. . . . . "

Cable from chief of station:

"Assume [the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn] is final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based. This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover up tracks,' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn now. . . . . . If assassination tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of station, the operations officer, and the administrative assistant mandatory. . . . . "

31 May 1961

Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours, Washington time:

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APPR 2. SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C). SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 0600Z. [0200 Washington time]

(Comment: The station's follow-up operational cable identified the source of Critic No. 1 as Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry, who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn and Chief of Station Owen at the consulate. At about 0100 hours, Dominican time, Andres Freitas telephoned Dearborn "to ask cryptically whether we had the news." Freitas said he would add details when he had them.)

3 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:

"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediately move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Owen, and Case Officer Cookson. It was also decided that Administrative Assistant Isabel Cintron should not return to Trujillo. Accordingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."

9 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject: "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:

"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room 7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion and Mr. Jameson.

"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."

(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson referred is not in the EMDEED operational files. We did not find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's

query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now remember. There is an unsigned memorandum in the EMDEED file dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject: "ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents." The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated by John Poulter, WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH (Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet and returned the memorandum to Poulter. This suggests to us that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked Esterline to have a summary pulled together.

J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that, if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of that fact in his record of the meeting.

A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.

The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination. Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story

> " . . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry) provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used to kill Trujillo."

Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons from the U.S. consulate to them, became known to the Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its interrogations of the captured assassins. The following summary is drawn from the FBI's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.

Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled at the house of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid was the cousin of Donald Reid Cabral, one of the key political plotters, but appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid

in being called as a physician learned the identities of the assassins, General Diaz said he could not allow Dr. Reid to go free. General Diaz forced Dr. Reid to furnish refuge in Reid's house for four of the assassins (General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, Salvador Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). The other assassins went their separate ways.

Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz and his three companions began to panic. (It might be noted here that the assassins were so sure that the coup would follow and they would all be national heroes that they had made absolutely know plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs. Reid in the presence of his companions. Pastoriza and Estrella were highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after a near-fight and a drawn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after a few hours. Diaz and de la Maza left later and were killed in a gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza and Estrella were captured, tortured, and confessed. The following are excerpts from the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz, the SIM investigator.

> ". . . after Pastoriza left General Juan Tomas Diaz composed a telegram addressed to President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, which said, 'We who have killed Trujillo urgently need your help in order to flee the country. Signed General Juan Tomas Diaz.'

Diaz requested Dr. Reid to take this telegram to 'Wimpy,' an American who owned a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo, and to tell 'Wimpy' to take the telegram immediately to the American Consul and to ask the Consul to code the telegram and send it through the proper channels to Betancourt.

"Reid refused to take the telegram on the basis that he had already implicated himself greately in the plot through no fault of his own and stated that he thought Diaz was trying to have him killed by asking him to take this telegram to 'Wimpy.' With that de la Maza became so incensed that he punched Reid and pushed him around and even went so far as to hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son. Reid then said that the plotters could kill the entire Reid family if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to 'Wimpy.'

"Estrella was asked to furnish what he knew concerning 'Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. Estrella related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maza and General Diaz. He was asked if 'Wimpy' knew the purpose for which these weapons were secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy' was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that 'Wimpy' works for the FBI, the State Department, or some other agency of the U.S. Government.

"Estrella was asked to explain how he knew 'Wimpy' was connected with the Americans and he replied that he had heard from the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intermediary between the American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella stated that 'Wimpy' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza and Luis Amiama Tio, and that 'Wimpy' had been the intermediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed their proposed coup with American authorities.

" . . . the source mentioned that during the interrogation of the conspirators who mentioned that United States officials were involved, they were all asked to identify the United States officials, but none of the conspirators were able to identify these officials by name and mentioned only that they were high functionaries of the United States Department of State. The only name of any American official which was disclosed during

these interrogations was the name of American Consul Hill in connection with the telegram that General Diaz wanted to send to Betancourt.

". . . the source noted that the telegram never reached Consul Hill because Diaz tore it up after the incident in Dr. Reid's house.

"(. . . the source commented that the interrogators themselves did not believe at this time that the U.S. Department of State was in any way involved with the plot. They thought the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement . . . was simply a method by which Amiama induced General Roman to give his approval to the plot. . . . . . it was the interrogators opinion at that time that if the North Americans had been involved in this plot, the plot would have been much better organized and the coup would have succeeded.)

" . . . by the latter part of June 1961, the investigation had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals involved in the plot, many of whom had been arrested and interrogated. The only ones not accounted for were Luis Amiama Tio and Antonio Imbert Barreras. As previously related, General Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieutenant Amado Garcia Guerrero were killed when resisting arrest. (At this point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Garcia, de la Maza, Amiama, and Imbert had been captured, and made to talk, it is certain that many many more prisoners would have been taken.)

"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who were brought before the courts were Tavares and General Roman. As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in connection with this plot was brought before any Dominican court. 'Wimpy,' the North American, was to have been brought before a court to be deported; however, Ramfis ordered that he was not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is aware, no action was taken against 'Wimpy.'"

"Wimpy" Berry, his wife, and their children were allowed to leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently visited Washington. While in Washington, Berry was given $2,000 for "expenses" by CIA. After amnesty was granted the plotters in December 1961, the Berrys returned to Santo Domingo and resumed operating their supermarket. They, especially Mrs. Berry, continued to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.

To recap:

a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles were never delivered.

b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.

c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns.

d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Headquarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female administrative assistant on 7 April 1961. Berry, at the request of the dissidents, gave the carbines to S. Thomas Stocker for temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly kept

them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used in the shooting. Ortiz, the SIM investigator, told the FBI that the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.

e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April 1961, Chief of Station Robert Owen evidently prevailed upon headquarters to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the motivations of men such as Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral, Amiama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters it captured revealed that they were not greatly motivated by a desire

to live in a free and democratic republic. Most of them were seeking vengeance or personal gain. General Roman, who was to have taken over and form an interim government, admitted that he had had no intention of permitting free elections. He had planned to establish himself as the new Dominican "strongman" replacing Trujillo. General Juan Tomas Diaz was bitter over having been publicly disgraced by Trujillo and then cashiered from the army. Antonio de la Maza also had a personal grudge. His brother, Octavio, had been killed by the Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying of Gerald Murphy in the Galindez case. Most of the others also had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.